Science and Technology Strategies against Asymmetric Warfare and Terrorism
By Eugene B. Skolnikoff

The world is awash with apocalyptic scenarios for the future, many based on the expectation of malign action by rogue states or terrorists employing anything from rudimentary technologies to weapons of mass destruction. These scenarios have become a staple of the oft-proclaimed War on Terror, inducing a climate of fear, playing a major role in initiating the war on Iraq, and leading to the increased expenditure of substantial resources for homeland security, intelligence, and military weapons.

Science and Technology (S&T) programs have received a significant part of those expenditures, much of that for weapons development. What should be the mix between investment in S&T for military capability and for other needs, recognizing that total safety is not possible? This is of considerable importance, for not only is the nation devoting substantial resources to the acquisition of weapons, many designed to fight an enemy that no longer exists, even worse it is neglecting other needs and, in some cases, building weapons that provide a rationale for other countries to do the same.

In this environment, what strategies for the effective application of S&T make sense and, equally important, what should be avoided? Investments in S&T, of course, are not on their own a solution to the asymmetry problem, or any policy problem for that matter. No technologies are perfectly reliable or effective, all have shortcomings; nor can S&T eliminate a threat on their own. A few general rules can serve as a guide to sensible strategies.

Strategy #1: Seek "dual-benefit" Research and Development (R&D) to be better able to respond to attack and to reduce vulnerabilities of a complex technological society.

The measures required to meet many of the significant societal needs that America confronts today are equally needed to respond to attack. To take one example, limiting the damage of a biological attack requires well-functioning and well-funded public health and medical care systems in place. Sadly, there are severe shortcomings in the public health system in the US, as well as inadequate routine medical care available for much of the population. Both are needed independently of the threat of a hostile attack. Much is required in these politically sensitive subjects, including substantial R&D.

Or, in another area, the potentially disastrous effects of severe disruption of the nation’s oil lifeline through destruction of off-shore drilling platforms, attacks on tankers, geopolitical actions in the Middle East, or other energy-related interventions, underline the danger of the nation’s dependence on oil. There are many steps that could reduce that dependence, some of a regulatory or economic character with technological underpinnings; others, such as development of alternative energy or carbon sequestration technologies, involving S&T directly.

More generally, one of the salient characteristics of the economy of an advanced nation is its dependence on closely-coupled technology-based systems. Communications, energy, food, transportation, manufacturing, resources, banking, water, and critical subsystems within all of these are exemplars. All depend on unbroken reliable operation for their functioning, often including substantial international interactions. As a result, a significant aspect of these systems is their vulnerability to disruption. Any technological system at some time is bound to "fail" in some way on its own as a result of unpredicted (often unpredictable) component stress or natural phenomena; but the vulnerabilities become obvious targets for purposeful attack. Even small-scale, low-tech attacks can potentially have major ripple effects and cause serious psychological trauma.

S&T are important contributors to reducing the danger these vulnerabilities pose in normal operation, through providing rapid replacement capability, redundancy, alternative systems, quality control, and enhanced protection. These same steps, common today to avoid inadvertent system disruption, are also clearly useful in protecting against intentional attack, recognizing that protection cannot be foolproof given the unavoidable trade-off between security and system performance.

In these and other issue-areas, the roles of S&T in the face of an asymmetric external threat are basically similar to their roles in meeting the demanding peacetime issues the nation confronts.

Strategy #2: Continue to give major emphasis to non-proliferation while refraining from developing new nuclear weapons.

Nuclear weapons in the hands of terrorists or rogue states is surely the most serious asymmetrical threat, given the destructiveness of a nuclear explosion. There are many S&T-related measures to reduce the danger: two obvious examples are technologies for detecting smuggling of radioactive materials or weapons and technology for tagging and tracking nuclear material in other countries.

But the task is not one that can be dealt with by S&T alone. The Cooperative Threat Reduction Program (Nunn-Lugar) to dismantle Russian weapons and discourage diversion is a major component of existing US non-proliferation policy. Obviously, other elements of that policy, particularly today with regard to Iran and North Korea, are essential.

An important further step would be to reduce this nation’s visible arsenal of nuclear weapons. More than 5,000 nuclear weapons remain in the stockpile (Federation of American Scientists (FAS), 5/2/07) with hundreds of American and Russian nuclear missiles still on hair-trigger alert (Blair, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (BAS), Jan/Feb. 07). Technology is critical to maintaining tight control of those weapons. But, even if they are safely secured, the implied message is that nuclear weapons will continue to provide significant geopolitical value, not a message likely to discourage interest in acquiring such weapons.

The US is also contemplating nuclear replacement warheads and the development of a new class of weapons, dubbed "bunker-busters." The lesson conveyed once again is that nuclear weapons will continue to have high political in addition to military value, a lesson that encourages other nations to seek to acquire their own arsenals. Moreover, new warhead development will lead to pressure to resume nuclear tests, a step that would reduce, not enhance, American security. The international political costs entailed in the development of new nuclear warheads is much too high to justify these warhead developments, even on the (controversial) grounds of safety for the former and the (much disputed) argument of need and effectiveness for the latter.

Strategy #3: Continue wide-spectrum biological R&D to minimize surprise and to enhance the possibility of protection and deterrence.

Bioterrorism, as serious as it might be, is not yet the massive threat posed by nuclear weapons and hopefully never will be. Perhaps the most disturbing danger lies in the possibility of clandestine production by small unheralded laboratories of weapons capable of large-scale lethality and infectiousness, with their place of origin unknown. R&D is critical to counter these and other categories of biological threat: for warning, development of possible broad spectrum countermeasures and vaccines, awareness of possible agents, scanning of external research, and design of means for tagging to eliminate anonymity. Broad biological research, including a major commitment to basic research, is essential to avoid surprise that could arise from unrealized gaps in knowledge and to maximize the possibility of effective counteraction and protection.

Strategy #4: Avoid developing and deploying space-based weapons that, if copied by others, would have the effect of dissipating asymmetries that presently favor the US.

The US should be uniquely interested in a peaceful space environment because of its deep security and economic dependence on space and related technologies. Satellites for intelligence, early warning, location, observation, protection, and communications are integral parts of the US military and intelligence capability, to say nothing of their importance to the national economy. Though weapons do not have to be based in space to attack other systems in orbit, weapons actually deployed in that environment do ratchet up perceived military threats to both ground and space systems. The apparent US intention to station weapons in space to serve as a base for attacking ground-launched missiles is a particularly questionable step on grounds of both geopolitics and technological feasibility.

The most important space-related role for S&T is in the development of physical protection for US space assets. But, the nation’s dependence on those assets also makes evident the benefits of keeping space as an arena free of weapons. Even though the US can no doubt continue to maintain its leadership in space technologies, others cannot be prevented from developing and deploying technologies that would make US systems vulnerable. A wise course for the US would be unilateral restraint and negotiation of agreed "rules of the road." Wiser still would be to refrain from unilaterally deploying weapons in space that would implicitly encourage other nations to do the same, sacrificing in the process the present US asymmetric advantage.

Strategy #5: Continue development of intelligence technologies to assist in confronting asymmetric threats.

Modern high technology applied to intelligence goals dates back many decades. Through the Cold War and into the space age, much attention has been given to the development of technologies to assess enemy capabilities, to warn of dangerous moves, and to intercept electronic signals and communications. Today, a mix of ground-, air-, and space-based intelligence technologies have become integral aspects of the nation’s intelligence arsenal and play a real-time role in actual hostilities.

Technology for intelligence purposes cannot be a total replacement for "human intelligence," as was evident in the run-up to 9/11 and has become evident in the al Qaeda, Afghanistan, and Iraq confrontations. Nevertheless, the potential to use advanced intelligence technologies against suspected WMD as well as rudimentary weapons continues to be one of the more powerful means the US has to counter asymmetrical threats.

Strategy # 6: Apply S&T to deal with terrorist weapons used in current hostilities.

This is an obvious strategy, much needed in the current confrontations in Iraq, that requires little elaboration here. It does, however, require disciplined attention to the real needs of the battlefield, not to development of weapons pursued for extraneous reasons.

Strategy #7: Limit controls on the export of S&T knowledge so as not to injure the American S&T enterprise.

The attempt to keep enemy states and terrorists from gaining access to American weapons-related technology has been a long term goal through a variety of export control programs, including the Export Administration Regulations and the International Trade in Arms Regulations. The purpose of both is to prevent knowledge produced in industry and universities that can have military application from reaching unfriendly hands. It does this by requiring licensing approval before militarily relevant S&T information can be exported to some foreign nationals abroad or given to them in the US ("deemed export"). Basic research is excluded from coverage by authority of a Reagan administration Executive Order, specifically endorsed by the National Security Council of the current Bush administration.

There have been many difficulties with implementation of the regulations. For one, it is not clear what is weapons-related. Essentially all technologies are dual-use – that is, can be used for peaceful or weapons purposes. The uncertainties as to what is covered are so large and the penalties so substantial as to put in question unlicensed interaction with foreign scientists, engineers, and institutions in a wide variety of subjects.

The operational meaning of the basic research exclusion is also unclear. The definition of basic research is tied to the unfettered open publication of the research results, but most basic research requires use of technology in the research process that could be subject to restriction. Does that mean a license is required to involve foreign scientists in university research, to collaborate on research with laboratories in other countries, to present research results in international conferences, or to teach a class containing foreign students? These are not idle questions, for exactly this has been recommended by a report of the Inspectors General of six federal agencies ("Interagency Review of Foreign National Access to Export-Controlled Technology in the United States," IGs of six agencies, April, 2004), with proposed implementing regulations placed in the Federal Register by the Department of Commerce in 2005 (withdrawn in 2006 after massive objection by universities).

The effects of these rules on American universities and on the strength of science in the US would be disastrous. Universities would have to install selection procedures and issue badges based on nationality for entry to specific laboratories, would have to obtain licenses for attendance of some foreign students in classes, would find collaboration with scientists in other countries difficult or impossible, and would be greatly impeded in the appointment of foreign scientists to faculty or research positions.

It is hard to imagine any steps that would do more damage to the American S&T enterprise. It is an enterprise that requires open exchange of information to thrive, that has become increasingly dependent on scientists and engineers from abroad, and that must stay abreast of, and interact with, S&T developments in nations that are becoming equivalent in scientific strength. But though the proposed rules have been withdrawn, the pressure for more restrictive regulations continues. Export controls are necessary, but the real costs of restrictions must be weighed against the risks of undesirable technology "leakage," recognizing that risks can never be completely eliminated and that technology transfer in practice cannot be permanently prevented. Stringent controls that impede research and generation of new knowledge will harm, not enhance, national security.

Strategy #8: Sustain the strength of S&T, the role of R&D in industry, the critical contributions of universities, and the ability to interact and cooperate with others.

Protection against asymmetric threats depends on a flourishing S&T enterprise in the US. To serve this objective, the most important asset the US has is the capability to meet the threats through leadership and excellence in S&T. Many elements are necessary: among others, a constructive tax and regulatory environment for industry, adequate budget support for R&D, innovation-inducing patent policies, tax incentives, and continued support for the much envied American university system. Of growing value is the encouraging expansion of constructive partnerships between industry and universities as the ivory tower syndrome recedes in influence.

Moreover, the US is no longer the single dominant S&T player across the board. The S&T enterprise depends on others to a degree not seen since the end of World War II. That dependency must be recognized and interactions with the rest of the S&T world allowed, in fact encouraged, without self-defeating limitations. And, it is essential that R&D continue to be supported not only to remain ahead of potential rivals, but to stay abreast of S&T in other nations. Future technological capabilities cannot be predicted in detail, nor can any field be ruled out as a possible source of both opportunities and dangers. The only effective response is to be the leader or, at least, the equivalent of any other, to be abreast of dangerous possibilities, and to have the knowledge to be able to craft workable, timely responses.

With this in mind, the declining basic and applied research portion of the federal R&D budget is of considerable concern. The development portfolio has received the lion’s share of the increases of recent years, predominantly for DOD and NASA (AAAS Analysis). There are important questions about how well and for what purposes development funds are deployed, particularly in the defense area, but the fall-off in research support is likely to have the more serious effect on the strength of S&T. It will compromise not only research itself and the ability to tackle subjects critical to dealing with asymmetric threats, but also the number and quality of future generations of scientists and engineers and the competitive strength of high technology industries. This should not be allowed to happen.

The scientific and technological capabilities of US industry, universities, and government constitute one of the nation’s greatest assets in confronting asymmetric warfare and terrorism. They cannot provide a perfect counter – nothing can. But wisely deployed, they can help to redress the imbalance. They can do so only if policies are in place to maintain their strength and innovative capacity, and are in congruence with policies that recognize the importance of the political and economic factors in which the S&T are embedded. And, they can do so only in concert with the capabilities of friends abroad. It would be tempting to believe that S&T offer a magic bullet to deal with these complex and dangerous issues. They do not. But they are major parts of the puzzle, need to be recognized as such, and adequately protected and supported. •

Eugene B. Skolnikoff is Professor Emeritus of Political Science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.