A Year in Iraq: A Military Commander’s Perspective on Irregular Warfare and Counterinsurgency
By Kevin W. Farrell

ver the past four years, the United States, the government of Iraq, and their allies have struggled with the challenges posed by irregular warfare in Iraq. As months have turned into years without a clear resolution, the armed resistance and violence in Iraq has been described as a last-ditch resistance by elements of the former regime, an insurgency with varying objectives, and civil war.

The central challenge to counterinsurgency efforts in Iraq and Baghdad in particular is the lack of consistent and reliable security for the vast majority of Iraqi citizens. Without security for Iraqi citizens, no other factor, such as infrastructure development or economic assistance, will count for much. A majority of Iraqis must first perceive that the Iraqi government and security forces have established and are protecting a secure environment in which they can live without constant fear for their personal safety. Counterinsurgency operations are not just about fighting the enemy on a battlefield, but also require that Iraqi citizens believe that they do not have to rely on the enemy for their personal security – that their government and security forces can provide them with lasting security and stability.

This paper is based on my observations and personal experience in Iraq as US Army Commander of the 1st Battalion, 64th Armor Regiment in East Baghdad from January 2005 to January 2006. I share insights gained about the nature of the violence, insurgency and counterinsurgency in Iraq, the consequences, and my thoughts on counter strategies. My firsthand experiences in Iraq – and prior contemporary study on the topic – do not make me an expert on this topic. I am, instead, a soldier who, based on my recent experience, has thought a good deal about the topic of urban warfare and counterinsurgency in Iraq.

The unit I commanded was a combined arms mechanized battalion composed of mechanized infantry, armor, and engineers which, at full strength, would have included over 900 soldiers and hundreds of vehicles. My higher headquarters assigned me and my fellow commanders the general mission to secure the territory we occupied, promote stability and security for the Iraqi residents and identify, destroy or capture insurgent forces. In turn, I assigned my subordinate commanders five main tasks throughout our time in Baghdad: isolate and neutralize anti-Iraqi/coalition forces; develop the capabilities of Iraqi security forces; secure key terrain and routes; and support governmental development and economic development.

The physical area for which I had responsibility – an area that comprises half of Baghdad east of the Tigris River – shifted four times in the course of 2005, the year we were in Baghdad. For most of the time it was about 100 square kilometers – slightly larger than the area of Manhattan, although for several months it was almost double that size. Our best estimate of the population size (which was undetermined) ranged from 1.2 to 1.4 million people, slightly less than the population of Manhattan. Geographically the area was referred to as Baghdad Jadeeda (New Baghdad), Tisa Nissan, 9W or simply East Baghdad; it surrounded but excluded the area known as Sadr City. My command area was about five miles east of – but worlds away from – the "Green Zone." During the second half of our year in Iraq, my battalion was responsible for supporting an Iraqi partner battalion whose responsibility was to secure the troubled district of Adhamiya, which is northwest of Sadr City.

The comments and observations that follow are drawn from the area for which I had primary responsibility. Through these descriptions, I hope that readers can better understand the complexities of the urban landscape and security challenges in Baghdad. The many layers of Iraqi identity make it extremely difficult to generalize and, therefore, complicate efforts to forge the way ahead. Understanding the economic, political, and social issues that fuel violence and hinder progress helps us analyze the elements of a strategy and tactics needed to combat them.

Demographically, our best estimates and those of our allies were that approximately 70 percent of the residents in this area were Shia, 25 percent were Sunni and the remainder were Christian. There was also a small group – perhaps 10,000 – of Palestinian origin who are not citizens of Iraq and, therefore, are unable to travel because they cannot obtain passports. Most, but not all, neighborhoods are divided by ethnicity.

For almost all of the Shia, living conditions were poor with large families crammed into small clusters of adobe-type dwellings. Open sewage was present on most streets and sometimes ponds the size of several dozen football fields formed due to the city’s failing sewage treatment plants located on the east side. The conditions were very poor throughout the year and worsened during the rainy months of February and March.

The Sunni neighborhoods in the southern and western part of my sector were generally better off, with clean, lighted, and paved streets, and regular trash pickups thanks to bribes paid to the city’s trash collection and electric agencies. Retired senior Iraqi military officers and government officials lived in these neighborhoods, although many have since moved away. The Christian neighborhoods were similar in appearance, yet were never the site of violence.

Violence against the coalition forces came from a number of sources, all of which are labeled "insurgents." I describe them as the "enemy" and address the four subdivisions within this general term. The first category includes terrorists who might be holdovers from the former regime of Saddam Hussein, an offshoot of one of the former regime elements or an international terrorist organization with agents operating in Iraq. The second category, militia forces, consists of armed groups represented by a political party usually with political representation in the Iraqi government. Some examples of this category would be the Mahdi Militia, the Badr Corps or SCIRI (the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq). A third and crucial category consists of the criminal elements which are flourishing in Iraq, especially since Saddam released all prison inmates in the spring of 2003. This category includes organized crime, most notably kidnapping rings but also theft, extortion, arms, and drug smuggling rings. The fourth category is foreign operatives not of Iraqi origin operating within Iraq on behalf of other nations seeking to influence the political course of Iraq through a variety of means.

The enemy has varied backgrounds and objectives. There is often infighting – they are hostile to each other and, in our absence, might be willing to destroy one another. The ebb and flow of sectarian violence in Iraq, sometimes labeled a civil war, is an example of this. More importantly, these disparate categories will cooperate with each other in pursuit of the larger goal of preventing a western-style representative democracy from establishing control in Iraq. Short term cooperation should not be confused with shared goals, identity or unity of purpose. An inadequate, but useful historical analogy would be the shared goal of the destruction of the Weimar government by the National Socialists and Communists in Germany in the early 1930s. Both groups despised the Weimar Republic and were committed fully to its destruction, but they remained mortal enemies nonetheless.

Further complicating the situation are individuals who might belong to several of the groups simultaneously. An opportunist might sign up as a member of a militia, or be hired by a foreign agent to commit a certain act in exchange for payment. All view the possibility of a strong Iraqi government that would operate in a manner acceptable to the US as extremely threatening and contrary to their individual interests. Thus, with varying degrees of intensity, the enemy will always be hostile to US forces. Moreover, the enemy will find a strong Iraqi government and forces, which operate in the style of a western representative democracy, deeply threatening. The more capable and western the conduct and outlook Iraqi security forces become, the more likely they are to be targeted by enemy groups. Iraqi forces that are inept, corrupt or follow the warlord model are far less threatening to the enemy.

While winning the trust and hearts and minds of the Iraqi people is crucial to counterinsurgency strategy, the primary objective should be to ensure a stable and secure living environment for them. However, these objectives are not mutually exclusive.

Where there are poor economic conditions, the Iraqi government and security forces could win the support of Iraqis by providing social services. The enemy uses similar tactics to gain control over the population. For example, housing is scarce in Baghdad. Through squatting and illicit selling of government land, the agents of Muqtada al Sadr have ameliorated the housing problem and have gained the support for the Mahdi Militia. Custom holds that if someone provides a home for you, your family and your descendants are indebted to them forever. Measures to support the Iraqi people socially and economically would help create renewed faith and allegiance to the Iraqi government and take popular support away from the enemy.

If Iraqis do not feel safe, they will take measures, even if it means joining the enemy, to give themselves safety and security. The central problem I noticed was that the Iraqi police, army, security forces, and the coalition’s armed forces could not provide a consistent level of security. Against the daily backdrop of suicide/homicide bombings, roadside bomb attacks against coalition forces and most of all, but least reported, widespread kidnapping, the average Iraqi will agree to virtually anything in order to protect his family and property. In most cases, only the militias offered to provide security. Many residents of Baghdad were eager to accept the militias, even though the cost was potentially very high – extortion money, oppression of women, and forced service. Although most Iraqis – predominantly Shia, many Sunni, and all Christians – were positively disposed toward American and Iraqi forces, they also realized that American forces could not possibly control their neighborhoods to the degree required because of the sheer numbers involved. The same is true for reliable Iraqi forces which represented a small percentage of the overall Iraqi army, police, and other security forces. Corrupt security forces were more numerous and varied, but still offered little promise of security. Only the militia forces in the various neighborhoods had a visible and permanent presence and, therefore, offered the promise of real protection.

How should the US and its allies proceed? The first imperative – and the recent "surge" is a belated reflection of this fact – is to establish security and order throughout Iraq, most importantly in Baghdad. Only with security can the population be weaned from supporting the militias and removed from the political violence plaguing Iraq. However, this is extremely hard to achieve for several reasons.

The sheer size of the population of Baghdad and the prevalence of violence will make this very difficult to achieve. Even if all Iraqi forces working in conjunction with the armed forces of the US were capable formations – which is most certainly not the case at this time – it would be difficult to attain the force ratios and constant presence to end the violence and crime in Baghdad.

Even if short-term security is established, it will not necessarily serve as proof for the Iraqi residents of Baghdad of long-term security. Therefore, their allegiance to militias will not dissipate; they will remain fearful of a return to the old violence when the Americans depart. Without the elimination of the militias as armed private armies and the return of order to the streets through a drastic reduction of crime, the residents of Baghdad will have little reason to believe in long term peace, because major aspects of the ongoing instability will remain.

If American forces continue to take the lead on establishing security, the Iraqis will not develop requisite faith in their own forces. The Iraqis certainly regard the American presence as short term. As a result, Iraqis will likely hedge their bets by making security arrangements for the long term, knowing that they will have to spend the rest of their lives there.

Security is the first requirement to end the violence in Iraq. And, without security, nothing else matters. Economic progress, national elections, new electric power stations, and even political and religious freedom will mean very little to the average citizen if families cannot be protected from random acts of violence or kidnappings. Thomas Hobbes had it right when he wrote in The Leviathan some 356 years ago that, "The final cause, end, or design of men…is the foresight of their own preservation and of a more contented life thereby…." •

Lieutenant Colonel Kevin Farrell was Commander of the 1st Battalion, 64th Armor Regiment in Iraq from January 2005 to January 2006. He is an Academy Professor in the Department of History at the United States Military Academy. He possesses the M.A., M.Phil. and Ph.D. from Columbia University and also has extensive operational experience as an armor officer with service in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Iraq.